Welcome to the competitiontoolbox RShiny App!

Overview

The competitiontoolbox RShiny application is a browser-based user interface for functionality embedded in the antitrust and trade R packages. It allows users to

  • simulate mergers, tariffs, and quotas under various specifications and market conditions,
  • numerically simulate horizontal and vertical mergers,
  • and visualize the estimated effects these market changes have on various outcomes.

Users may input different simulation parameters on the lefthand-side panels found in the pages linked by the tabs above. These parameters include the assumed competitive environment and market demand system. Users may also edit market conditions listed in the Inputs tables such as firm prices, margins, and shares. Both horizontal and supply chain mergers are available for simulation, including upstream, downstream, and vertical mergers. Example inputs for each type of simulation are provided to users by default in the Inputs table.

To better understand the types of predictions that these models make, users may also view the distribution of outcomes from thousands of numerical simulations. See Taragin and Loudermilk (2019) and Sheu and Taragin (2020) for more details.


Get Started

To simulate a horizontal merger, proceed to Horizontal listed under the Mergers tab.

To simulate a merger in a supply chain, proceed to Vertical listed under the Mergers tab.


To numerically simulate a horizontal merger, proceed to Horizontal listed under the Numerical Simulations tab.

To numerically simulate a merger in a supply chain, proceed to Vertical listed under the Numerical Simulations tab.


To simulate a tariff, proceed to Tariffs listed under the Trade tab.

To simulate a quota, proceed to Quotas listed under the Trade tab.


When run, each simulation outputs a series of tabs that provide detailed information on the simulated merger, tariff, or quota. They are:

  • Summary: Outputs summary statistics of the simulation, including changes in HHI, consumer and producer surplus, and share-weighted prices.
  • Details: Outputs product-level changes in prices and compensating marginal cost reductions. For supply chain mergers, both upstream and downstream price and share changes are reported.
  • Elasticities: Outputs matrices of estimated elasticities and diversion ratios.
  • Diagnostics: Outputs differences between outputted and fitted values in order to diagnose the simulation. Key underlying parameters are also reported.
  • R Code: Outputs the corresponding R code that runs the inputted simulation. This provides practioners reproducible code as they transition to scripting their own analyses.
  • Messages: Outputs any warning or error messages encountered by the app.

Supported by vandy.png

Simulate a Horizontal Merger

Enter Inputs








Note: All price changes as well as compensating marginal cost reduction are (post-merger) share-weighted averages. A negative Consumer Harm number denotes benefit, while a negative Producer Benefit number denotes harm. Numbers in parentheses denote harm and benefit as a percentage of post-merger revenues.




Note: diagonal elements are own-price elasticities. Off-diagonal elements are the cross-price elasticities of row with respect to column.
Note: above are own-price elasticities

Percent Differences between Inputted and Fitted Values Relative to Inputs



Parameters


                    
                      See the
                      antitrust
                      package vignette for more details about the parameters displayed here.
                    
                  


                  

Warnings


Errors

Simulate a Merger in a Supply Chain

Enter Inputs








Note: All price changes as well as compensating marginal cost reduction are (post-merger) share-weighted averages. A negative Consumer Harm number denotes benefit, while a negative Producer Benefit number denotes harm.




Note: diagonal elements are own-price elasticities. Off-diagonal elements are the cross-price elasticities of row with respect to column.
Note: above are own-price elasticities

Percent Differences between Inputted and Fitted Values Relative to Inputs


Parameters


                    
                      See the
                      antitrust
                      package vignette for more details about the parameters displayed here.
                    
                  


                  

Warnings


Errors

Simulate a Tariff

Enter Inputs








Note: all price changes are (new tariff) share-weighted averages. Negative Consumer Harm or Net Harm numbers denotes benefit.







Note: diagonal elements are own-price elasticities. Off-diagonal elements are the cross-price elasticities of row with respect to column.
Note: above are own-price elasticities


Inputted vs. Fitted Values


Parameters


                    
                      See the
                      antitrust
                      package vignette for more details about the parameters displayed here.
                    
                  


                  

Warnings


                    

Errors


                  

Simulate a Quota

Enter Inputs








Note: all price changes are (new quota) share-weighted averages. Negative Consumer Harm or Net Harm numbers denotes benefit.







Note: diagonal elements are own-price elasticities. Off-diagonal elements are the cross-price elasticities of row with respect to column.
Note: above are own-price elasticities


Inputted vs. Fitted Values


Parameters


                    
                      See the
                      antitrust
                      package vignette for more details about the parameters displayed here.
                    
                  


                  

Warnings


                    

Errors


                  

Horizontal Simulations


Description:

Description:

Vertical Simulations


Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Tariff Simulations


Description:

Additional Research

Luke Froeb and Steven Tschantz (Vanderbilt University) have developed a vertical merger simulator app that allows users to compare simulated vertical merger effects across different barganining models, including Nash-in-Nash two-part pricing and various models of derived demand. The app allows for a competitive landscape consisting of either one upstream firm and two downstream firms, or vice-versa.

This vertical simulator accompanies Boshoff, Froeb, Minnie, and Tschantz (2020), which provides theoretical frameworks for the various models included in the simulator.


Supported by vandy.png